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THE PROCESS OF RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL RAPPROCHEMENT 
BETWEEN BULGARIA AND YUGOSLAVIA IN 1920s AND 1930s – AN 
INTERNATIONAL ECUMENICAL PERSPECTIVE
1
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Abstract: 
This article addresses the role of the ecumenical organization, the World Alliance for Promoting 
International Friendship through the Churches, in the complicated process of religious and 
political rapprochement between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in the 1920s and 1930s. It argues that 
the Bulgarian and Yugoslav National Committees of the World Alliance formed a diplomatic 
channel for tackling the problems between the two countries, predominantly the question of 
1 An earlier version of this article appeared in the Journal of Ecumenical Studies, vol. 50, no. 4 (Fall, 2015), pp. 
583-605, titled "The World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches and Religious and Political 
Rapprochement between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in the 1920’s and 1930’s." This expanded version is used with 
permission from J.E.S. 
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 Macedonia, but ultimately the rapprochement process between the two countries failed due to the 
outbreak of World War II. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1937, the representatives of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Tsardom of Bulgaria 
signed a Pact of Eternal Friendship. The declaration of friendship was a result of a process of 
political and religious rapprochement that had begun near the end of 1920s. In this context, the 
influence of the ecumenical movement, especially the peace organization World Alliance for 
Promoting International Friendship through the Churches, (hereafter abbreviated to WA), has to 
be highlighted. The history of the ecumenical movement briefly mentions that discussions held 
among the leading ecumenical representatives and Balkan religious leaders led to an exchange of 
visits between official delegations of the Serbian and Bulgarian churches. These visits paved the 
way for a similar action on the political level.
2
 The activity of the ecumenical movement and the 
discussions and visits mentioned above have largely been neglected in the national histories of 
the two countries and in the history of international relations between the two World Wars. In 
this article, we aim to discuss the contribution of the WA in the rapprochement process between 
the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) and the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC), and the states 
of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in the 1920s and 1930s. To fully understand the chain of events and 
the role the WA had in the process of rapprochement, we first examine the foreign policy and the 
ideology of the two countries as well as the activity of the WA. 
                                                             
2
 Ruth Rouse and Stephen Charles Neill, eds.  History of the Ecumenical Movement. Volume I, 1517–
1948 (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 2004), 562. 
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Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations and the “Macedonian problem”3 
From the middle of the nineteenth century up to the 1930s, Serbian-Bulgarian and later 
Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations were marked by conflicts over Macedonia: the national revival of 
the Macedonian population, and by wars (the Serb-Bulgarian War 1885–86, the Second Balkan 
War 1913, and the First World War 1914–1918). Agreements of friendship and cooperation 
(1897, 1904, and 1912) were only brief episodes of relief in a conflict that lasted for decades. 
The “Macedonian Question”, i.e. the status of Macedonia and its relations with Greece, Bulgaria 
and Serbia, though officially settled with treaties of Bucharest, London and Paris (1912, 1913, 
1919), remained a constant problem in the Balkans throughout the interwar years.
4
  
                                                             
3
 About Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations see: Živko Avramovski, “O stavu jugoslovenske vlade prema 
devetojunskom prevratu u Bugarskoj 1923. Godine,” Istorija XX veka, IX (1968), 132–86; Desanka 
Todorović, “Pitanje jugoslovensko-bugarske granice na Mirovnoj konferenciji u Parizu 1919. Godine,” 
Istorija XX veka, IX (1968), 63–132; Г. Васиљевиќ, Хронологија на настаните од југословенско- 
бугарските односи за време на владеењето на Александар Стамболиски, (Skopje, 1973); Desanka 
Todorović, Jugoslavija i balkanske države 1918–1923, (Belgrade,1976); Ž. Avramovski (ed.), 
Jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi u XX veku, I–II, (Belgrade, 1980–1982); Živko Avramovski, “Pitanje 
balkanskog garantnog pakta i jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi 1925. godine u svetlu britanske politike na 
Balkanu,” Vojnoistorijski glasnik, 2 (Belgrade, 1984), 87–111; Živko Avramovski, Balkanska antanta 
1934–1940, (Belgrade, 1986); Branko Pavlica, “Razgraničenje Jugoslavije s Bugarskom (1919–1922),” 
Tokovi istorije, 1–2 (2002), 16–23; Dmitar Tasić, “Prisajedinjenje Caribroda i Bosiljgrada Kraljevini SHS 
1920,” Tokovi istorije, 3 (2007), 121–31. 
4
 According to Miroslav Hroch the Macedonian national identity became relevant only in the 1870s. By 
1900 some intellectuals had formulated the concept of a Macedonian nation based on the linguistic 
differences between the Macedonian and Bulgarian languages, the specificities of their geography and 
historical development. Miroslav Hroch, ‘National Movements in the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires’, in 
John Breuilly (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism (Oxford, 2013), 192. Even today 
there is no agreement about roots of the Macedonian national identity. According to Bulgarian historians 
the Macedonian nation was created after the Second World War. 
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 Disputes were conducted through diplomatic and academic circles, press and propaganda 
channels abroad, through international organizations as well as by representatives of cultural, 
educational, and religious institutions.
5
 
 In the interwar period, the relations between the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 
(the KSCS) and the Tsardom of Bulgaria can be divided into two periods. During the first stage, 
in the 1920s, the main issue on the agenda was the enforcement of the peace agreements and the 
curbing of the Macedonian nationalist movement. A precondition set by the KSCS for 
developing friendly relations with Bulgaria was that Bulgaria should shut down the Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) base on Bulgarian territory and withhold 
logistical support to that organization.
6
 During the second stage, in 1930s, a gradual 
rapprochement between the two countries took place, in which the SOC and the BOC played an 
essential part. 
 After the First World War, according to the Treaty of Neuilly signed in November 1919, 
the Tsardom of Bulgaria had lost its border territories Caribrod (now Dimitrovgrad), Bosilegrad, 
the right side of the river Timok (today in the south-eastern part of the Republic of Serbia), and 
                                                             
5
 Macedonia was divided between Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria according to the provisions of the London 
Peace Treaty signed on May 30, 1913. Vardar Macedonia was ceded to Serbia, Aegean Macedonia to 
Greece and Pirin Macedonia to Bulgaria. Dragoslav Stranjaković, “Srbi i Bugari u prošlosti,” Glasnik 
SPP, 9 (September 1—August 19, 1946), 157–63; Andrew Rossos, “The British Foreign Office and 
Macedonian National Identity, 1918–1941,” Slavic Review, 53, 2 (Summer 1994); Ivan Ristić, “Politika 
sporazumevanja u vreme nerazumevanja,” Teme, 3 (2012), 1033–46. 
6
 Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, Vnatrešna Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija, 
founded in Thessaloniki 1893 (name used since 1919) rejected the partition and called for a free 
Macedonia – independent or autonomous, i.e. reunited with Bulgaria. This goal was not to be achieved 
only through peaceful means, but also by attacks aimed at the Bulgarian, Yugoslav and Greek authorities, 
who were considered to be occupiers. As the stronghold of the organization was in Bulgaria, the state 
authorities there had a profound influence on controlling the activities of the organization. Until 1924, the 
IMRO was led by Todor Aleksandrov and after his assassination by Ivan Mihailov. Dmitar Tasić, 
“Vojno-politička akcija ‘makedonstvujuščih’ u Kraljevini SHS/Jugoslaviji 1919–1934. Godine,” Arhiv, 3 
(2002), 92–107; Ivan Ristić, “Diplomatsko-konzularna predstavništva i predstavnici Kraljevine SHS u 
Bugarskoj 1920–1929,” Arhiv, 1–2 (2012), 97–112.  
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 Strumica (today in the south-eastern part of the Republic of Macedonia).
7
 Starting in 1919 the 
Macedonians organized raids into Greek and Yugoslav Macedonian territories. These raids were 
usually launched from Petrich, a district in South West Bulgaria, where the Macedonians had 
established a virtual state within the state.
8
  
In the beginning of the 1920s the leader of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and 
the Prime Minister from 1919 to 1923, Aleksandar Stamboliyski, was prepared to control and 
even cooperate with the IMRO. At the same time, he denounced Macedonian extremism and 
declared this publically during his visit to Belgrade in 1922. In March 1923, the two countries 
signed an agreement in Niš and promised to fight extremism.9 This agreement was one of the 
reasons for a coup d'état in Bulgaria that took place in June 1923. Stamboliyski was forced to 
step down and was brutally murdered by Macedonian extremists. At first, the KSCS considered 
the coup a direct threat to its security, but the situation was eased by the mediation of foreign 
allies. In the following years, several Bulgarian political emigrants resided in the KSCS. The 
violence of Macedonian extremists in Bulgaria continued during the ‘Tsankovist period’ from 
                                                             
7
 Peace Treaty of Neuilly between the Allied and Associated countries and Bulgaria was signed on 
November 27, 1919. Bulgaria as a defeated country was to pay war reparations to the winning side; its 
armed forces were drastically reduced and general conscription was abolished. According to the treaty, 
Bulgaria was obligated to punish the perpetrators for the war and recognize the KSCS, who signed the 
treaty on December 5, 1919. Ivan Ristić, “Bugarska politička emigracija u Kraljevini SHS,” Istorija XX 
veka, 2 (2012), 41–62.  
8
 Macedonians levied special taxes on the peasants in their Petrich enclave. Apart from inducing fear of 
Macedonian terror in Bulgaria, the Macedonians fought among themselves as well. They had two main 
factions – the main split was between the autonomists (right) and federalists (left). Unlike the left, the 
right waged an armed struggle. In the beginning of 1920s, the conflict led to the occupation of the city of 
Nevrokop by an IMRO unit, which tried to annihilate the local federalist branch. The attacks were so 
fierce that the head of the BOC, Metropolitan Stefan, suggested privately that the state authorities should 
pay the autonomists 50 million leva to cease their attacks. R. J. Crampton, Bulgaria (Oxford 2008), 229–
30. 
9The Niš Treaty signed on March 23, 1923, allowed the KSCS to fight against IMRO on Bulgarian 
territory, since Stamboliyski could not rely on the weak Bulgarian army. He had created an alternative 
armed force, the Orange Guard. According to the Niš Treaty, the two countries agreed to keep order along 
the border by joint patrolling. 
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 1923 to 1926, under the rule of Prime Minister Aleksander Tsankov. Although it was 
internationally condemned, Tsankov’s government cooperated with the IMRO. The IMRO 
projected a confusing double image – it was an organization that was often fighting violently for 
the Macedonian national cause, but at the same time it was an instrument used by Bulgaria to 
overcome the losses of the First World War and to pursue the goal of a Great Bulgaria.
10
  
Bulgarian authorities criticized Belgrade for protecting Bulgarian immigrants and 
demanded that Belgrade move them out of the border areas. Another issue for mistrust was the 
implementation of cultural and educational policy in Macedonia. Bulgaria demanded that the 
people living in Vardar Macedonia had to be identified as Bulgarian, primarily through changes 
in the local school system.
11
 The Yugoslav side was not prepared to meet those demands. 
Instead, the KSCS continued a policy of assimilation, previously conducted by the Kingdom of 
Serbia, rather than to recognize the Macedonian identity of the local population. The KSCS 
quickly acted to eliminate the Patriarchal (Greek) influence in the south of Vardar and the 
Exarchist Bulgarian presence. In September 1920, the Macedonian Orthodox community in 
Vardar Macedonia was transferred to the jurisdiction of SOC.
12
The Greeks implemented the 
same kind of policy in Aegean Macedonia.
13
 
                                                             
10
 A. Rossos, Macedonia and the Macedonians (California, 2008), 150. 
11
 Bulgarian nationalist ideology engaged historiography, ethnography, and Völkerpsyhologie to provide it 
with arguments to lay nationalist claims on territories outside Bulgaria, such as Macedonia. They argued 
that all Slav-speakers in Macedonia were “Bulgarians”. Greek and Serbian nationalists supported the 
jurisdiction the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople over the Christian population in Macedonia, 
while Bulgarian nationalist ideology stressed language as the most important and visible marker on which 
the Bulgarian national as well as the ecclesiastical autonomy from the ecumenical patriarchate was based. 
Marius Turda, “National Historiographies in the Balkans, 1830–1989,” in Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz 
(eds.), The Contested Nation: Ethnicity, Class, Religion and Gender in National Histories, (New York, 
2011), 476.  
12
 Unification of Serbian regional churches under one ecclesiastical authority was proclaimed in Belgrade 
in 1919, but it was finally carried out only after the Churches in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Old Serbia and 
Macedonia seperated from the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. As a result of 
negotiations with the Ecumenical Patriarchate from 1913 to 1914, Southern parts of the Church were to 
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 The crisis between Bulgaria and the KSCS was reflected in assassinations, attacks on 
properties separated by the border, bomb planting, kidnapping, and disruption of rail traffic 
between the two countries, thus generating a general atmosphere of insecurity. In addition to 
violence, Macedonian cultural, educational, and folk organizations (Macedonian National 
Committee) in Bulgaria, as well as magazines and various nationalist organizations like Otec 
Paisij managed to cause some misinterpretations.
14
 
 After King Alexander I of Yugoslavia suspended the constitution and proclaimed a royal 
dictatorship in 1929, the leaders of Ustaša – Croatian Revolutionary Organization (UCRO) and  
IMRO reached an agreement on future actions and signed a declaration of mutual understanding 
known as the Sofia Declaration. This declaration envisaged the establishment of independent 
states of Croatia and Macedonia. Actions of Macedonians placed Bulgaria in considerable 
danger. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
be joined to the Church of the Kingdom of Serbia, but due to the war the decision was not implemented. 
In late July 1919, negotiations in Constantinople began again. According to the agreement between the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate, the KSCS and the SOC, the unity of the SOC and reestablishment of the 
Patriarchate was recognized. An agreement was reached that the dioceses, which had been under the 
jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate were now transferred to the jurisdiction of the SOC. These 
were: Skopje, Ras-Prizren and Debar-Veles, part of the Metropolis Voden, Diocese Polean-Doiran and 
diocese of Strumica. Under Article V of the agreement, the Government of the KSCS was to help the 
Patriarchate of Constantinople financially with 1.5 million francs. The Ministry of Finance of the KSCS 
paid that amount in three payments in 1919 and 1922. Radmila Radić, Život u vremenima: Patrijarh 
Gavrilo (Dožić) 1881–1950, (Belgrade, 2011), 146–47. 
13
 In September 1924, Bulgaria and Greece signed the Kalfov-Politis Agreement, in which Greece 
recognized Bulgarian nationals on its Macedonian territory. Thus a crisis broke out in the relations 
between the KSCS and Greece, because the KSCS feared that this agreement could justify Bulgaria’s 
claims that the Vardar Macedonians were Bulgarians as well. As the KSCS threatened to abrogate its 
alliance with Greece, the latter pronounced the agreement void. A. Rossos, Macedonia and the 
Macedonians, 133–50. 
14
 Desanka Todorović, “Jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi u drugoj polovini 1923. (Kriza u septembru),” in 
Ž. Avramovski (ed), Jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi u XX veku, I (Belgrade, 1980), 179–96; Vuk 
Vinaver, “KPJ i jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi 1919–1939. Godine,” in Ž. Avramovski (ed), 
Jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi u XX veku, II (Belgrade, 1982), 170; Živko Avramovski, “Makedonsko 
pitanje u jugoslovensko-bugarskim odnosima od 1918–1925. Godine,” in Ž. Avramovski (ed), 
Jugoslovensko-bugarski odnosi u XX veku, I (Belgrade, 1980), 147–76; Petar Dragišić, Jugoslovensko-
bugarski odnosi 1944–1949, (Belgrade, 2007), 13; D. Tasić, “Vojno-politička akcija,”, 92–107. 
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  The ascension of Adolf Hitler to power in Germany encouraged the revisionist forces in 
Europe and increased insecurity. In particular, the situation became more difficult due to the 
tightening of relations around issues of disarmament and the certainty that the Conference on 
Disarmament would not be a success. It was concluded in London that the change in the military 
and political balance on the continent might lead to the outbreak of war. Great Britain took 
diplomatic steps to bring about reconciliation between the major powers.
15
  
In September 1933 the Permanent Council of the Little Entente met in Sinaiа to discuss 
the need for a Balkan pact. Bulgaria was invited to join Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece, and 
Turkey. However, Bulgaria refused to join if in return it did not get the territorial exit to the 
Aegean Sea and demanded that the rights of Bulgarian minority in neighboring countries be 
honored. At the same time Bulgaria openly expressed the need to strengthen relations with 
Yugoslavia.
16
 Yugoslavia and Bulgaria already entered into a new phase of relations. Small signs 
of improvement could already be seen by the end of 1920s when the two countries signed the 
Pirot Agreements over minor issues like the railway connections. At the end of the 1920s an 
                                                             
15
 In Spring 1933, Prime Minister McDonald personally attended the Conference on Disarmament, to 
demonstrate its importance. On the way, he stopped in Paris and tried to win over the French government 
for its policy of pacification, which included the reduction of the French armed forces, in order to save the 
Conference on Disarmament and prevent uncontrolled arming of Germany. Not having found adequate 
response in Paris, McDonald began to implement his campaign together with Italy. In order it to be a 
success McDonald was ready to make certain concessions to the revisionist countries. The result of this 
policy was the Four-Power Pact project also known as a Quadripartite Agreement. This had an impact on 
the position of the Balkan states. Countries of Little Entente – Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania 
– were vigorously against the Four-Power Pact and revision of the peace treaties thus undertaking a 
campaign in Paris to dissuade France from accession to the Pact. Turkey saw the Pact as a threat that 
could lead to revival of plans for the division of its territory. Ž. Avramovski, “Stav britanske diplomatije 
prema sklapanju Balkanskog sporazuma (1933–1934),” Radovi, 16 (1983), 139–80. 
16
 Yugoslav and Bulgarian royal couples met three times in second half of 1933. Additionally a series of 
cultural events were organized which contributed to the rapprochement of the two countries. Ž. 
Avramovski, “Stav britanske diplomatije,” 150; Vladan Jovanović, Vardarska banovina 1929–1941, 
(Belgrade, 2011), 316. 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2016) XXXVI, 1 49
 Association for the Balkan Union was established, which held its first conference in 1930.
17
 At 
the Balkan Conferences held from 1930 to 1933, in addition to economic, cultural, social, and 
legal cooperation, the possibility of drawing up a Balkan political pact was also discussed. The 
Macedonian question, again, proved to be a fundamental precondition for establishing some sort 
of political cooperation in the Balkans.
18
 Other Balkan countries interpreted the Yugoslav-
Bulgarian rapprochement as a threat of Slav hegemony in the Balkans. Already in the autumn of 
1933, Тurkеу and Romania made preparations to sign a Balkan pact of four countries from which 
Bulgaria would be excluded. After the visit of Tsar Boris and Prime Minister Nikola S. 
Mushanov to Belgrade in December 1933 Bulgaria expressed its willingness to join the planned 
Balkan Pact. The Yugoslav government and King Alexander aspired to find a solution that 
would guarantee Bulgaria’s participation thus leaving it to the Bulgarian authorities to find an 
acceptable platform for its participation.
19
 
                                                             
17
 National groups that participated in the conference were represented by unofficial figures that were in 
contact with the governments of their countries and their views on the Balkan conference were in line 
with the official policy of the country that they represented. Živko Avramovski, “Stav britanske 
diplomatije,” 140.  
18
 In an attempt to preserve the status quo in the Balkans and not allow the unresolved Balkan issues (e. g. 
Macedonia) in this area to be the cause of a possible infiltration of Soviet Union influence, British 
diplomats were very reserved towards the proposals of their own representatives in Yugoslavia and 
Bulgaria, who asked that the British government itself or together with France and Italy, influence 
Bulgaria and its neighbors to reconcile. Thus, a 1933 memorandum from the Foreign Office says that it is 
not sure to what extent the inhabitants of the territory around Skopje, called Yugoslav Macedonia, “have a 
moral right to what might be called minority treatment. They are the raw materials from which, in happier 
circumstances, might be made, calm and loyal subjects of Bulgaria or Yugoslavia.” Ž. Avramovski, “Stav 
britanske diplomatije,” 147.  
19
 Italy and Hungary were dissatisfied with these developments and this visit sparked increased discontent 
in Greece and Romania as well. Serb intransigence towards Bulgaria's demands which treated the 
Macedonians as a Bulgarian national minority, on the one hand and IMRO terrorist activity on the other, 
allowed the Greek political circles to hope that the rapprochement cannot come in due time, thus they 
were surprised by the rapid development of events. The prevailing opinion was that since Bulgaria had no 
inclination of changing its stance towards Greece it opted to break out of its isolation by reaching a 
rapprochement with Yugoslavia as their most powerful neighbor. Ž. Avramovski, “Stav britanske 
diplomatije,” 150. 
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  The British government carefully followed the course of these negotiations and insisted 
that Bulgaria's inclusion in the Pact should be considered. British and French diplomacies had 
insisted upon it, aiming to strengthen the alliance and prevent the spread of German influence in 
the region. Since the Yugoslav government held similar views, British political mediation was 
carried out mainly through Belgrade. In the beginning of 1934, the Yugoslav government asked 
the Bulgarian government to present their standpoint so that it could become a member of the 
Balkan Pact. Instead, the Bulgarian government proposed a bilateral non-aggression pact with 
other Balkan countries. It was considered insufficient and therefore in February 1934 the Balkan 
Pact was signed in Athens without Bulgaria.
20 
 
In May 1934, the supporters of the Zveno movement, the Zvenari, executed a coup d'état 
in Bulgaria.
21
 The new government, led by Kimon Georgiev, moved away from Italy, aiming to 
consolidate relations with France and establish closer relations with Yugoslavia, as well as with 
its other neighbors. For this reason, there was a need to end the conflict with Macedonians.
22
 
Zvenari government sent the army into the Petrich enclave governed by Macedonians and 
                                                             
20
 The Balkan Treaty was signed on February 9, 1934 by Greece, Turkey, Romania, and Yugoslavia with 
the aim of preserving the status quo of the First World War. Ž. Avramovski, Balkanska antanta, 163; 
Fred Singleton. Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia (New York, 1976), 81. Nevile Henderson, British Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1929–1935), assessed the 
position of Yugoslavia as very difficult, because it had to take into account the wishes of Romania, 
Greece and Turkey on one hand. On the other, Yugoslavia had to be careful as not to do anything that 
would reverse the trend of rapprochement with Bulgaria. He claimed that Bulgaria, in fact, did not want to 
have four allies, it was interested in keeping the territorial status quo, but was trying to find one or more 
allies among the stronger of the Balkan countries that would help her gain compensation at the cost of 
weaker, or at the cost of Greece. Ž. Avramovski, “Stav britanske diplomatije,” 167–68. 
21
 In 1927, a Bulgarian supra-party pressure group called Zveno was founded by intellectuals like the 
Social Democrat Dimo Kazasov and members of the Military League, most prominently the colonels 
Kimon Georgiev and Damian Velchev. The group opposed the party system, government corruption, and 
terrorism of IMRO. Its foreign policy aim was to improve relations with Yugoslavia. In 1934 Kimon 
Georgiev became the new prime minister and Kazasov become ambassador in Yugoslavia. Frederick B. 
Chary, History of the Bulgaria (ABC-CLIO, 2011),  77–8. 
22
 After signing the International Convention for the Definition for Agression in 1933, the pressure to deal 
with IMRO grew considerably, because Bulgarian support for IMRO could be considered as an act of 
aggression. R. J. Crampton, Bulgaria, 247. 
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 arrested Macedonian extremists in other parts of Bulgaria. The leader of IMRO, Ivan Mihailov, 
was forced to leave the country. Macedonia, for the first time in many years, was not an obstacle 
for the Bulgarian foreign policy.
23
  
In 1935 with the support of Tsar Boris III, a new cabinet was formed in Bulgaria. Its 
leader Georgi Kyoseivanov continued the pro-Yugoslav foreign policy. At the same time, 
Bulgaria tried to review the Neuilly settlement with Romania and Greece, concerning areas in 
the North and the South. The improvement of cultural cooperation was a clear indication of 
stronger relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. In October 1934, while King Alexabder 
arrived on an official visit to France, one of the IMRO members, Vlado Chernozemski, in 
collaboration with the UCRO, assassinated him in Marseilles. However, close cooperation 
between the two countries continued and was confirmed in 1937 with a signing of a “Pact of 
Eternal Friendship.”24  
At the end of the 1930s, both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria had distanced themselves from 
France and were moving towards a closer cooperation with Germany and its allies. In 1938 the 
Balkan States – Bulgaria and the Balkan Entente – signed the Salonika Agreements by which 
they renounced the use of war and condoned massive rearmament. Thus the agreement enabled 
Bulgaria to rearm itself, where previously it had been restricted according to the peace agreement 
of Neuilly.
25
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 After the Salonika agreements, the Macedonian question still remained on the agenda. 
Yugoslavia offered a customs union, a military alliance and frontier rectifications, if Bulgaria 
would renounce its claims on Macedonia, but although Bulgaria did not wish to fight for 
territorial expansion, it was not prepared to give up its claims on Macedonia.
26
 
 
The Ideology and the Activity of the World Alliance 
The WA was established in 1914 as a successor to an Anglo-German organization 
founded after mutual visits by British and German church leaders and theologians in 1908 and 
1909 to promote friendly relations between the two nations.
27
 During the accession celebrations 
of Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1913, the initiators of the WA met industrialist and philanthropist 
Andrew Carnegie, who donated two million dollars to promote peace through the cooperation of 
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 all Christian churches. These funds, which were used to finance the activities of WA, were 
controlled and distributed by the American based Church Peace Union.
28
 
After the war, the WA gathered for its first meeting in October 1919. There was a brief 
confrontation, followed by conciliation between the German and the French representatives. 
More importantly several fundamental decisions were made at that meeting. Firstly, it was 
decided to support the proposition presented by the Swedish Archbishop Nathan Söderblom to 
convene a global Christian conference to discuss the challenges the societies and the churches 
were facing.
29
 Secondly, WA dealt with its constitution and appointed its officials into office.
30
 
Thirdly, WA declared its support to the League of Nations, proposing the League accept all 
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 states that had expressed their wish to join the League and called on the League to respect human 
rights and religious freedom.
31
  
One of the cornerstones of the WA’s identity and ideology was the understanding that the 
organization was the spiritual equivalent of the League of Nations, the ‘soul’ of the League. As 
Dickinson stated in 1920, the League of Nations was based on those principles of international 
Christian fellowship the recognition of which the WA was formed to encourage.
32
 The League of 
Nations was seen as a valuable piece of machinery for dealing with international troubles in a 
peaceful manner. But as the WA stated, a will on the part of the peoples was needed to work the 
machine in a peaceful way. The spirit of Christian friendship alone could ensure its ultimate 
success.
33
  
From the viewpoint of the League of Nations, the WA was one of many social 
organizations surrounding the League. In the beginning of 1920s, when the number of such 
organizations was still limited, the resolutions of WA even reached the Council of the League, 
but they failed to impress the diplomats and no member took any action regarding them.
34
  
The WA as an instrument for promoting peace and friendship, and was interested in 
general problems of the world political order. Most of these problems were the outcomes of the 
war, e.g., the question of disarmament and the problem of minorities, including religious 
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 minorities. Among other ecumenical initiatives, it was certainly the most political and politically 
orientated organization. In the 1920s, the WA played an especially important role in the 
Ecumenical movement. From 1925 the Life and Work movement steadily took on a leading role 
in the movement.
35
 The WA reached its peak in 1928 and thereafter the organization faced a 
continuous decline. Its decline was accelerated by the financial crisis beginning in 1929, and the 
failure of the World Disarmament Conference in 1934. At the beginning of 1930s, when the 
political order in Europe began to shift from democracy to authoritarianism, the WA had lost its 
credibility and clarity in vision. Therefore, the emerging regimes, especially National Socialism 
in Germany, left the WA in a paralyzed state.
36
 It did not possess methods to counter the 
necessary ideology and policy advanced by the totalitarian regimes.
37
 
The methods used by WA were generally those of the nineteenth century campaigns for 
such causes as the abolition of slavery. The aim was to influence public opinion on key issues to 
such extent that governments could not ignore the voice of the people. To achieve this goal 
debates were initiated, and declarations, petitions and appeals were passed. One cornerstone of 
the WA was to organize events for promoting peace, like peace-Sundays. In addition to these 
events material on peace-work was printed. The WA also established relations between churches 
representatives and politicians. Because the representatives of WA were often leading 
                                                             
35
 Harjam Dam, Der Weltbund für Freundschaft der Kirchen 1914–1948. Eine ökumenische 
Friedensorganisation (Frankfurt am Main, 2001), 401. 
36
 Although the German National Committee was one of the founders of the Alliance, the committee had 
already during the Weimar Republic period faced some difficulties and opposition. The German National 
Council only received support from the German churches in matters that offered a prospect of furthering 
the German national cause, e.g. war guilt, the revision of the treaty of Versailles, etc. Julian Jenkins, in 
describing the activity of the German National Committee, has justifiably claimed that the downfall of the 
German National Committee “was a precursor for the collapse of the World Alliance.” Julian Jenkins, “A 
Forgotten Challenge to German Nationalism: The World Alliance for International Friendship through the 
Churches,” Australian Journal of Politics & History, 37, 2 (1991), 296. 
37
 Priit Rohtmets,”Ecumenical Peace Organization ‘The World Alliance for promoting International 
Friendship through the Churches’ and Resistance to Totalitarian Regimes between Two World Wars,” 
Usuteaduslik Ajakiri, 64, 1 (2013), 82–3. 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2016) XXXVI, 1 56
 clergymen, these relations were established in practice as well as in theory.
38
 Several leading 
members of the WA were also politicians. Over the years, work with the youth, seen as the future 
public opinion leaders, gained more and more attention.
39
  
The success of the WA mostly depended on the activity of the local national councils 
(NC). In addition to national councils over the years the Alliance began to emphasize more and 
more the importance of regional conferences in order to foster relations between neighbors and 
to focus on issues related with neighboring societies, e.g. minority questions.
40
 
Harjam Dam in his book on the history of the WA correctly pointed to a 
misunderstanding that the WA was an organization of individual Christians and did not represent 
the official position of the churches. There were, in fact, two types of councils, based on the 
principle of individuality and councils that officially represented the churches. It is true that the 
principle of individuality was characteristic to the ideology of the WA and the most successful as 
well as the largest council of the Alliance, the National Council of the United States, represented 
that individualistic approach. At the same time in Finland, Norway, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, 
Belgium, Portugal, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania the councils consisted of official church 
delegates. According to Dam, the council members in Yugoslavia and in Bulgaria also officially 
represented the churches.
41
 It is true, however, that the individual ideological approach was more 
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 or less evident and emphasized by local representatives in those countries as well. Yugoslavia is 
a good example to follow. 
What has not been emphasized enough in the study of the WA is the fact that over the 
years the WA itself evolved. A clear shift in the rhetoric of the organization can be determined in 
1928, when advocating for the establishment of the International Court in Hague and announcing 
that the Christian community could under no condition support the war, the Alliance claimed to 
represent Churches in more than 30 countries and not merely a private group of pacifists.
42
 
 By the end of the 1920s, a change of WA’s working methods seemed inevitable. It had 
not defined its dogmatic basis, and its ideology was extremely vague in formulation. The WA 
activity relied on the work in national councils intended to influence politicians and societies. 
Unfortunately, without the Alliance’s necessary ideological and theological background activity 
it was not able to guarantee a real success. One has to agree with historians Darril Hudson and 
Harjam Dam, who have said that despite the fact that the WA’s appeals and resolutions were 
often nothing more than a kind of ‘Christian blessing,’ the Alliance “continued its discussion and 
consideration of political issues on a plane once removed from reality.”43 The problem was, in 
fact, discussed and analyzed by the members of the WA. In 1932 the issue was raised at a 
meeting in Czechoslovakia by a German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who warned the 
ecumenical movement and the WA that “without a coherent theology of the Church’s public role 
the ecumenical movement risked being at the whim of political trends.”44 Unfortunately, as far as 
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 the WA was concerned there were no results and therefore in the 1930s the international public 
largely ignored the organization. In describing the relations of the WA with the rest of the 
ecumenical movement, were much the same. Although in the beginning of the 1930s Henry 
Louis Henriod became the joint secretary of the WA and the Universal Council of Life and 
Work, the Alliance decided not join the initiative presented in 1937 by the Life and Work and 
Faith and Order movements to establish the World Council of Churches. The WA was left to 
pursue its aims in a world where its message of promoting peace was less and less heard. After 
the Second World War, due to the establishment of the World Council of Churches, the Alliance 
was dissolved in 1948.  
 
The Orthodox Community and the World Alliance 
The Orthodox community joined the WA after the First World War.
45
 In 1919, a 
delegation of the Faith and Order movement visited the Balkan states. In beginning of 1920 the 
Chief International Relations organizer of the WA, George Nasmyth, during his visit to Greece, 
KSCS, Romania and Bulgaria met with church leaders and representatives who expressed their 
wish to join the international ecumenical movement and the WA. Nasmyth described South 
Eastern Europe and the tense relations between the Balkan nations, as the “storm center of 
international relations” in his report presented to the Management Committee of the WA. In his 
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 opinion, there was only one force – namely religion – of enormous power and almost unlimited 
opportunity for service, which had so far not been used for peace-promotion purposes. In 
countries, that claimed allegiance to the Eastern Orthodox Church as their national faith, no 
major conflicts between the churches existed.
46
 The visit of Nasmyth paved the way for the 
Balkan representatives to come to Switzerland in August 1920.
47
 The month of August was 
remarkable, because three different ecumenical organizations meetings were held in Switzerland: 
first in Geneva the meetings of the Faith and Order, then the Life and Work and finally in 
Beatenberg the meeting of the WA. The Orthodox representatives attended all the meetings.
48
 
The viewpoint of Nasmyth on the high importance of religion in the Balkan states was 
true, at the same time the opinion on the harmony between different religious groups has to be 
approached with some criticism, because there was, in fact, a misunderstanding between the 
BOC and the SOC. As the relationship between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia is inseparable from the 
history of the Orthodox churches in the two countries, the problems between the churches, of 
course, an impact on the relationship between the two countries, being a precondition and an 
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 important factor in the rapprochement process. Furthermore, according to the principles of 
church and state relations in Orthodox countries, the church was considered to be an essential 
part of state-building and often took part in state functions, particularly in fostering foreign 
relations.
49
 Thus, the contribution of the Alliance and its impact on the relations between the two 
states has to be analyzed in a more detailed manner.  
Another fact, which has to be analyzed with some caution, is the membership principle of 
the WA’s national committees in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. As stated earlier, according to Dam, 
the council members in Yugoslavia and in Bulgaria officially represented the churches. 
However, according to Yugoslav religious media the WA activity in Yugoslavia was considered 
to be a private initiative.
50
 Having said that, it is also true that WA’s national committee 
members held high positions in the two churches and in their societies that enabled them to 
conduct the church and state foreign policy in a more private and noncommittal manner.
51
  
 The WA national Committee of the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes, NCSCS, 
held its first meeting in February 1921. The committee had seven representatives from the 
Orthodox Church, seven representatives from the Lutheran Church and three representatives 
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 from the Reformed Church. During the first years, the presidency rotated between several 
clergymen. During the first two years, the President of the Committee was Metropolitan 
Archbishop of Banat, Ilarion Radonić.52 In 1923 Nicholai Velimirovitch, (Nikolaj Velimirović), 
an ecumenically minded Bishop of Žiča and the diocese of Ohrid, replaced him.53 In 1924 
Professor Irinei Georgevitch (Djordjević) became the President of the committee, holding the 
same position at the beginning of 1930s. In 1923, he had succeeded a theologian Professor Dr. 
Voyslav Janitch (Vojislav Janjić)54 as a representative of the NCSCS in the Management 
Committee of the WA and remained in this position until 1928.
55
 Janitch, an MP, had been the 
first secretary of the NCSCS. There had been a separate secretary for the Protestant members of 
the committee since the establishment of the committee. The first secretary was Samuel 
Schumacher, a pastor of Petrovopolje.
56
 Among the vice-presidents were Serbian Bishop Irinei 
Ćirić57 and Patriarch Gavrilo (Gabriel) Dožić (after 1938).58 
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 From 1925, the President of the NCSCS was Irinei Ćirić, Bishop of Novi Sad. The 
Yugoslav media repeatedly stated that “the main merit of maintaining links with foreign fraternal 
Churches belonged to Bishop Irinei, who was the real spiritus agens in all such ideas and 
movements.”59 From 1929 Irinei belonged to the Executive Committee of the WA, from 1930 
served as Chairman of the Management Committee and from 1939 was the President of the 
entire organization.
60
 In addition to Irinei, there were several ecumenically minded bishops and 
theologians who took part in the WA’s activity. Most of them were also active in the work of the 
YMCA and other international ecumenical organizations.
61
 Among the members of the NCSCS 
were Archimandrite Valerian Pribičević, Archpriest Gabriel Milošević, Episcopal administrator 
Adam Vereš, Bishop Mark Kalođera, and senior Jacob Jahn.62 
The Bulgarian National Council, BNC, also established in 1921, was from the very 
beginning led by the Metropolitan of Sofia, Archbishop Stefan (Gheorghiev), who, like Irinei, 
was one of the leading representatives of the entire WA.
63
 From the early stages of the WA 
Stefan belonged to the Management Committee. He was an influential church leader, one of the 
key people representing the Orthodox community in the WA. From 1927 he served as a member 
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 of the administrative board of the WA.
64
 Another member, whose activity had an impact on the 
entire WA, was Prof. Stefan Zankov, who, at first served as a secretary of the BNC and was in 
1933 appointed as a special secretary of the WA for the entire Orthodox community.
65
 The vice-
president of the BNC was Dr Paissiy, Bishop of Znepole. At first, there was a corresponding 
secretary for the evangelical denominations. Pastor D. N. Furnajiev, who filled that post, later 
became a longstanding treasurer of the BNC.
66
 
The fact that the WA appointed a secretary for the Orthodox community proves the 
importance the Orthodox community had in the Alliance. A precondition for achieving a 
stronghold within the WA was the influential position the churches had in the societies of South 
East European countries. There is, however, another and a more problematic side to this – the 
burning issues which had emerged in the same societies, for it was precisely for this reason the 
Orthodox community gained so much attention in the WA. 
As in Western or Eastern Europe, each country in South Eastern Europe had its own 
problems to tackle and the internal issues of each of them had to be resolved first. They were 
mainly the outcomes of the national awakenings in the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
results of the Balkan wars, the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, as well as the aftermath of 
First World War. These conflicts not only influenced the internal situation of each country, but 
had an impact on foreign relations with neighboring countries as well.  
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 It is no surprise that these problems were mentioned in the reports of national 
committees. Greece, for example, mostly dealt with the consequences of Turkish repression of 
Greek civilians, whereas the NCSCS tackled a problem of minorities, which according to the 
report of the NCSCS was a new challenge to face. Interestingly enough, the question of 
minorities in the context of foreign relations was not on the agenda of the national committees 
until the mid 1920s. Both the BNC and NCSCS since their establishment had organized public 
events to promote the ideas of the WA and considered it necessary to get their governments to 
support the aims of the organization.
67
 
To some extent they succeeded, so when in 1921 Dickinson made his first visit to the 
KSCS Dr. Janitch organized meetings with the Foreign Minister, Minister of Religion (Public 
Worship) and with Metropolitan Ilarion Radonić, who was the president of the NCSCS, as well 
as with Metropolitan Josif Cvijović. After Janjić had explained the aims of the WA, Metropolitan 
Josif expressed his sympathy for the movement, saying that the entire Orthodox Church would 
support the WA that serves to promote friendship among nations. Janjić organized a meeting 
with the representatives of Protestant Churches in the KSCS, who were members of the 
NCSCS.
68
 The impression Dickinson had from the visit was twofold: on the one hand he had 
heard complaints from the Protestants about the violation of religious freedom and human rights 
of the minorities; on the other hand he had had conciliatory discussions during his visit and 
therefore believed that the WA was in fact doing a good thing in promoting friendly relations. He 
believed that the KSCS in principle respected the rights of minorities. However at the same time 
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 he remained cautious because of the centralizing policy of the state, i.e. a policy that claimed 
Serbia to have a central position in the state.
69
 
 To maximize the effect of the WA’s work in the region, the Alliance initiated regional 
conferences, the first of which was organized in Novi Sad in July 1923. Delegates from the NC’s 
of the KSCS, Romania and Hungary attended it; however representatives of Bulgaria did not 
participate, because they could not obtain passports.
70
 The conference adopted a resolution on 
the racial, religious, and linguistic rights of minorities and the tasks of the Church in the 
protection of these rights.
71
 Dickinson, who in the 1920s chaired the International Federation of 
League of Nations Societies and promoted the ideas of the League of Nations all over the world, 
visited national councils from Constantinople to Athens in 1926. On that occasion, he wrote in a 
report: “The two chief danger spots of Europe lay in the Balkans and on the German-Polish 
frontier and every action which tends to remove misunderstandings between the peoples of these 
countries has undoubted value in the preservation of world peace.”72 
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  A resolution, first adopted in Athens, was once again presented at a Balkan regional 
conference held in Sofia in 1927, to emphasize the need to foster friendly relations between the 
Balkan countries. It was suggested that a real achievement would be to organize Orthodox 
conferences, cooperation between Balkan theological faculties and even publish a journal for the 
Orthodox community.
73
 These statements were, however, overshadowed by the growing tensions 
between the churches and states of Bulgaria and KSCS. 
 
Relations between Serbian and Bulgarian Orthodox Churches in the Early 1920s 
After the First World War the Tsardom of Bulgaria and its church were put in isolation. 
Along with other Central Power countries Bulgaria had lost the war, and the foreign relations of 
the BOC were limited because of its tense relationship with the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
74
  
The SOC, at the same time, gained a stronger foothold in the Orthodox community than 
before the First World War. After the war the SOC, in principle, supported the stance of the 
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 Ecumenical Patriarchate and considered the BOC as a schismatic church.
75
 In 1921, during the 
first council meeting of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad [ROCA], where Metropolitan 
Stefan represented the BOC, Serbian Patriarch Demetrio did not allow Stefan to prolong his stay 
in Sremski Karlovac. It was Nikola Pašić, the prime minister of the KSCS, who orchestrated this 
policy towards Metropolitan Stefan.
76
  
Stefan’s visit had a follow-up in the Serbian press, where a number of critical articles 
were published. Most importantly the articles criticized the decision to accept Bulgaria as a 
member of the League of Nations. The Bulgarians were seen as war criminals and therefore the 
decision to accept the Bulgarian Metropolitan on the soil of the KSCS was criticized. It was said 
that the Bulgarian Church had not deserved the invitation from the ROCA hierarchy and that 
Stefan had come to the KSCS without the invitation and approval of the Serbian Patriarch.
77
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 The leaders of SOC and ROCA suffered consequences as well. The Russian Metropolitan 
Anthony (Анто ний – Алексе й Па влович  рапови цкий) was attacked on the basis that he had 
no right to receive visitors on the territory of the Serbian Patriarchate, especially those whose 
hands were covered with the blood of Serbian priests. The press emphasized that Stefan, as an 
envoy of the Bulgarian government, came to S. Karlovac to plead with the Russian Synod to 
intervene for the removal of the anathema pronounced against the Bulgarian Church by the 
Patriarchate of Constantinople while the Prime Minister Alexander Stamboliyski “openly flirted 
with the Communists in Bulgarian Parliament.” In conclusion it was stated that conciliation with 
Bulgarians depended on the Bulgarians themselves and sincere repentance from the BOC was 
needed.
78
 It is fair to suggest that because of conflicts that had taken place in the recent past the 
Serbian Patriarchate and the KSCS felt offended. Having become more influential in the Balkan 
region after the First World War, they used the influence to put pressure on Bulgaria and its 
church to demand repentance.  
The attitude had a more personal touch as well. Namely, the KSCS Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was very suspicious of the activities of Metropolitan Stefan. As Stefan was the leader of 
the BOC, it affected bilateral relations in general. According to a report from May 1923 these 
suspicions were caused by the alleged activities of the Metropolitan during the war in 
Switzerland, including his connections with representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church.
79
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  Criticism and suspicions varied with reconciliation and willingness to establish friendlier 
relations. In an article, published in the official newspaper of the SOC, Glasnik Srpske 
Pravoslavne Patrijaršije, Glasnik SPP, in 1923, it was stated that the BOC had not been entirely 
in agreement with the Bulgarian government at the time of the Balkan wars. The newspaper 
referred to an article published in a Bulgarian religious magazine, Pastirsko delo, where the 
church had distanced itself from the atrocities in Serbia, declaring that they had been against the 
war and asked for forgiveness. Here, Stefan's escape from Bulgaria and stay in Switzerland 
during the war was mentioned in a positive context.
80
 Nevertheless, a year later, Glasnik SPP 
bluntly declared that the Bulgarian people had in the past and were in the present acting against 
the Serbian people with the blessing and support of Bulgarian priests.
81
  
 
The World Alliance – a Mediator in the Rapprochement Process between Bulgarian and 
Serbian Orthodox Churches 
The BOC managed to end its isolation by joining the ecumenical movement. In doing so, 
it helped to establish diplomatic relations with some of Bulgaria’s neighboring countries.82 This 
can be considered as one of the two major achievements of the WA. The other was that the WA 
created a forum for Balkan churches to negotiate issues related to the outcomes of the Balkan 
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 Wars and the First World War. The latter, however, at first managed to worsen even further the 
relationship between the two churches, but in the 1930s these dissensions were overcome. 
In 1924, Bishop Nicholai Velimirović, as a leading member of the NCSCS said in 
connection with a plan to convene an ecumenical meeting, that the Bulgarian schism was a 
bilateral problem between Constantinople and the BOC. It had nothing to do with other 
Orthodox churches. In fact, while some members of the Orthodox community took notice of the 
dispute, the rest of the community had a neutral stance concerning the matter. Nicholai referred 
to the SOC as being among the neutral churches. As the churches worked together in the WA, 
Nicholai considered it impossible for the WA to justify its name without the participation of the 
BOC.
83
  
Publically the SOC considered the BOC as their equal.
84
 In reality, however, the SOC 
was rather cautious and therefore bilateral relations remained modest until the end of 1920s. At a 
council meeting of the SOC in 1928, after analyzing the activity of the WA, it was decided to 
monitor the BOC and although speeches were delivered to promote cooperation between the two 
churches, in the end it was stressed that cooperation should be informative in the present state of 
affairs.
85
    
Still, there were a few occasions, when the two churches established contacts. For 
example, after an earthquake in southern Bulgaria in April 1928, Patriarch Demetrius of the SOC 
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 sent 1,000 dinars as aid for the victims. Another 100,000 was collected by the SOC church 
members and delivered to Bulgaria by a special envoy. On that occasion the Synod of the BOC 
and Demetrius briefly corresponded.
86
  
Most importantly, the representatives of the two churches met at the WA meetings. In 
September 1927 a regional conference of the WA took place in Sofia, with participants from 
three Balkan countries – Bulgaria, the KSCS and Romania. The Greek delegation did not 
participate because of a conflict on the Greek-Bulgarian border. The conference was presided 
over by Willoughby Dickinson, who remained in Sofia after the conference to discuss the 
question of minorities. A clear sign of openness for friendlier relations was the fact that 
Bulgarian clergy served a solemn liturgy together with Bishop Irinei Ćirić.87 In general, the 
conference advocated for a deeper commitment to foster friendly relations between the Balkan 
states and societies. To achieve this goal an idea was presented to establish an organization of 
National Orthodox Churches, based on common faith and Orthodox Christian canonical 
principles. In an article, published after the conference in the newspaper Vesnik, the BOC was 
praised for its work and for educating young scholars.
88
 
Willingness to cooperate was mutual, though it did not mean that the KSCS had 
overcome the umbrage of the past, or that Bulgaria and its church were prepared to give up 
claims on Macedonia and to tolerate the policy of its neighbors in areas which they considered to 
be their territory. Another issue regarded the refugees who were staying in Bulgaria.
89
 As the 
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 WA saw itself a defender of minorities, it did not come as a surprise that Bulgaria raised the 
question of protecting their minorities in neighboring countries in the WA. Already presented in 
the mid-1920s, the demands of the BNC had become louder since 1929. They had a profound 
impact on the bi- and multilateral relations of Balkan countries and their churches in the 
following years. 
The NC reports published in 1928 allude to the emerging conflict over minorities. The 
KSCS report praised its own policies–minorities were represented in the parliament– while at the 
same time criticizing the Bulgarian government for supporting illegitimate activities on the 
territory of the Kingdom of SCS. According to the report, this issue was a serious obstacle for 
WA to gain a broader reception of its work. The BNC mentioned that it had dealt with Bulgarian 
minorities living in neighboring countries and stated that the work had unfortunately showed no 
results.
90
 
 A regional conference, which was to be held in the spring of 1929, might have eased the 
situation, but because the constitution was suspended and a personal royal dictatorship was 
introduced by King Alexander of Yugoslavia, the conference was postponed and tensions 
escalated. In the summer of 1929 Metropolitan Stephan submitted a memorandum to the WA on 
violence against the Bulgarian minority in Yugoslavia. He saw it as a threat to peace in the 
Balkans. It is fair to suggest that he represented the views of the Tsardom of Bulgaria. The WA 
as an instrument for peace was therefore obliged to find a peaceful solution to the conflict 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
discussed during the debate, which started in 1929. It did not have any positive effect on the relations 
between two Churches. 
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 through its network. At the same time, the Serbian clergy were criticized for their views and 
activities during the Ottoman rule in the Bulgarian journal, Cъrkoven vestnik.91  
The appeal was put on the agenda of the Management Committee session in September 
1929 in Avignon. Before the discussion a private meeting had been organized, where the 
representatives of the SOC and the BOC decided to remove the memorandum from the agenda of 
the Alliance until further notice, and instead organize meetings of the two NCs to resolve the 
situation.
92
 
According to a report by Bishop Irinei Ćirić, sent after the meeting to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav side as an act of friendship agreed 
that the first meeting was to be held in Sofia. The meetings were supposed to result in a decision 
on convening a regional conference that was to be held in Belgrade.
93
  
 Returning from France to Bulgaria Metropolitan Stefan passed through Belgrade, but 
there is no indication that he met the SOC representatives. A few weeks later he invited a 
Yugoslav diplomat, Ljubomir Nešić, for a meeting and according to Nešić complained that he 
was in a very difficult position because the memorandum had been withdrawn in Avignon. The 
withdrawal had been a result of an agreement with Yugoslav delegates, but now Bishop Irinei 
wished to go back on the agreement. Nešić advised him to negotiate directly with the Yugoslav 
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 delegates and avoid public controversy. Stefan trusted Nešić to deliver his letter to Yugoslav 
delegates.
94
 Postponing the planned Yugoslav visit to Sofia made the Bulgarians anxious. 
As there was no settlement and the regional conference had been postponed, the WA 
discussed the question once again in 1930 and decided to interfere by sending the leading 
representatives of the WA to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to reach an agreement between the two 
sides. In January 1931 honorary secretaries Henry Atkinson and Jules Jézéquel first visited 
Yugoslavia, and later Bulgaria and Yugoslavia for the second time. During their first stay in 
Belgrade they had meetings at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as with the representatives 
of the local NC. It was agreed that the regional conference of four neighboring countries should 
take place in May of 1931. However, during their visit to Bulgaria, the BNC refused to accept 
the decision to organize a regional conference before a bilateral meeting. Therefore, a 
preliminary meeting was agreed upon, to take place at the beginning of May 1931. The Yugoslav 
National Council (YNC) accepted these terms and the honorary secretaries left Belgrade with an 
agreement to summon the regional conference after a private meeting between the two parties. 
Both meetings were to be held in May 1931.
95
  
By March, all the necessary arrangements for the conference, beginning with the 
invitations and ending with a program, had been made. Unfortunately, at the last minute, the 
YNC refused to visit Bulgaria, because it felt insulted by a speech, delivered by Metropolitan 
Stefan at a funeral in Sofia, where he had mentioned that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was 
oppressing the Bulgarians on its territory. In fact, it was the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign 
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 Affairs, who had cancelled the authorization for the visit to Sofia. Although it had grudgingly 
approved a conference in Belgrade, the decision not to go to Sofia meant that the regional 
conference in Belgrade was meant to be a failure, because the Bulgarians could not accept the 
invitation.  
The YNC was now in a difficult position because they had promised to send their 
representatives to Sofia twice, but had failed to do so. At that moment there appeared to be 
tensions between the WA and the YNC. When Jézéquel in his letter to Bishop Irinei mentioned 
the decision of the YNC not to go to Sofia, the Bishop of Bačka in his answer considered the 
statement insulting and even questioned the future membership of the YNC in the WA. 
However, at the same time more constructive opinions were presented. Irinei Ćirić in a letter to 
Willoughby Dickinson and Friedrich Siegmund-Schultze pointed out that the YNC was willing 
to ignore Stefan’s speech, as long as the same attitude was not practiced as the general line of 
Bulgarian policy. Dickinson and Siegmund-Schultze expressed their hope to find a peaceful 
solution.
96
 In June 1931, the WA meeting of the Executive Committee discussed Bishop Irinei’s 
letter that explained that the YNC had intended to go to Sofia, but were prevented by ‘certain 
events’. Irinei asked Dickinson, whether he should resign from the Executive Committee. The 
committee decided that there was no need for him to do so and that the question of Bulgaria and 
Yugoslavia should be put to the agenda of the WA Cambridge International Committee 
conference in September 1931.
97
  
In this context it comes as no surprise that the bilateral relations between two churches 
worsened at the beginning of the 1930s. There were a few signals of relief, and the conflict 
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 between the two churches escalated in general.
98
 In 1930 the question of bilateral relations was 
on the agenda of the SOC Council, where it was once again decided to monitor the BOC.
99
 At 
the same time, a debate on the history and the relations of the two countries began on the pages 
of Bulgarian religious journals Tserkoven Vestnik and Pastirsko delo and Yugoslav journal 
Vesnik.
100
 In August 1930 Archpriest Bogoljub N. Milošević, who claimed to be a supporter of 
Serbia's rapprochement with Bulgaria, wrote in Vesnik that the final goal of the rapprochement 
had to be a complete unification of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and the creation of a powerful state, 
‘whose hips will be leaning on the Julian Alps and the Black Sea and the shoulders on the 
Morava and Vardar valley.” In order to achieve this the churches had to join forces. He criticized 
the attacks on Bulgaria by his fellow countrymen in connection with the crimes committed in the 
past and appealed not to open old wounds.
101
 The Bulgarian media described his views on the 
full-scale unification as chauvinistic and patronizing. The Bulgarians accused the Yugoslav side 
for oppressing Bulgarian minorities and other ethnic groups in Yugoslavia. Milošević wrote in 
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 his reply that the Yugoslavs did not see the population of Macedonia as an ethnic minority. 
Macedonia was a province of Yugoslavia, where the people were of same blood and faith as all 
other Yugoslavs. Furthermore, he opposed the Bulgarian accusations of ‘Serbian chauvinism’ as 
a greatest impediment to the Bulgarian-Serbian rapprochement. According to him the biggest 
obstacle for rapprochement was the activity of “Bulgarian protégés’ from Macedonia – 
‘makedonstvujušči’, who were responsible for the hatred, disorder and killings.”102 The language 
used remained the same, as it had been in 1920s. 
There were no signs of tension between Yugoslav state authorities and the representatives 
of the SOC,
103
 but it seems that the steps of the state authorities, i.e. withholding permission for 
the church to participate in a meeting with the BOC representatives, had put the clergy in an 
uncomfortable position. In August of 1931, the Bishop of Niš, Dositei, in his letter to the 
Patriarch of the SOC, Varnava (Rosić), mentioned that he had met Bishop Irinei, who was 
confused, because state authorities had not yet given him permission to travel to the WA 
conference in Cambridge.
104
  
Metropolitan Stefan of the BOC planned to issue a statement in Cambridge on the 
discrimination of Bulgarian minorities in Romania, Greece and Yugoslavia. The latter received 
the strongest criticism. The first contact in Cambridge clearly signaled a clash ahead, however, 
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 after private talks between the parties the situation was once again eased, so that the discussions 
that followed could be described as more constructive than emotional. However, it did not mean 
that the conference reached an agreement, which would have been satisfying for both parties. 
After an overview of events surrounding the Balkan regional conference and the statement by 
Bishop Irinei, in which he on behalf of the YNC expressed readiness to visit Sofia, it was again 
decided that the regional conference was to be held in Belgrade as soon as possible, but only 
after the YNC had visited Bulgaria. The Yugoslav delegation opposed the idea that the visit 
should be marked by a specific deadline. There was, however, a significant proposal added to the 
Balkan regional conference resolution–the Greeks offered a solution by proposing that the next 
Balkan regional conference could be held in a country other than Bulgaria or Yugoslavia, if the 
two countries should in the nearest future fail to come to an agreement.
105
  
As it was thought to be a good solution to end the status quo, the WA proposed to 
organize the next Balkan regional conference in Bucharest. The Bulgarians and the Yugoslavs 
were willing to accept the decision, although it managed to cause unrest. In the annual BNC 
report for 1931, the committee described the WA’s reputation in Bulgaria as ‘of pessimistic 
character’, because in analyzing the two major issues the WA focused on–disarmament and 
minorities–Bulgaria in both cases felt that the WA had failed them. The Bulgarian committee 
also expressed its deep regret that the question of minorities was removed from the agenda of the 
Bucharest meeting, although it had been accepted at first.
106
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 Since 1929 Metropolitan Stefan had aimed to present a memorandum to attract public 
attention to the violation of human rights of Bulgarian minorities in the neighboring countries. 
However, the Yugoslav delegation had managed to remove the issue from the agenda through 
negotiations. Nevertheless, the memorandum was once again put on the agenda at the WA 
Management Committee meeting in Geneva in August 1932.  
According to the minutes of the meeting the memorandum was followed by an extensive 
discussion. Although Bishop Irinei and the Yugoslav representatives did not agree with the 
estimates of two million Bulgarians, who had lost their ecclesiastical independence outside of 
Bulgaria and whose civil rights were violated, the Bulgarian delegation managed to achieve for 
the first time, what they had come for–after a discussion the WA decided to appoint a minorities 
commission of seven members to discuss the matter. The Management Committee admitted that 
the decision was in fact a result of the incompetence and lack of solid information about the 
matter. However, it did not mean that the issue was forced to become a subject of endless 
discussions at committee hearings. Concerning the regional conference the Management 
Committee expressed its hope that the conference would take place in Bucharest in spring 
1933.
107
 
The Yugoslav reaction, presented in newspaper Glasnik SPP was predictable–the 
information presented during the meeting had in their opinion been misleading. They went even 
so far as to ask whether they should remain in the WA.
108
 Yugoslavs firmly opposed to any kind 
of activity that could have had an effect on their stronghold in Macedonia. For example in 
January 1933, Professor Sergei Troicki of the Orthodox Theological Faculty in Belgrade, 
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 published an analysis of the BOC Constitution project, criticizing their claim of jurisdiction over 
dioceses in Macedonia, Southern Serbia and for the Diocese of Niš–all now belonging to the 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the SOC. Troicki argued that from the canonical point of view the 
BOC had no right to present such allegations, because the unity of Macedonian provinces had 
been confirmed by the official acts of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. There was no need for 
consent from the BOC to pass these acts and as the BOC was officially considered schismatic, 
thus it was impossible for the SOC to negotiate with the BOC. Having said that, Troicki admitted 
that the Slavic Orthodox churches had not accepted the decision of the Ecumenical Patriarchate 
on the BOC nor had they declared the decision wrong. He called upon the BOC to drop the 
demands and initiate negotiations with Orthodox churches to end the schism.
109
 
 Only a month later the public statements changed considerably. For example, in an article 
“We and the Bulgarians” published in Glasnik SPP, the national unity of Bulgarians and 
Yugoslavs and the ecclesiastical union between the two churches was hailed.
110
 It was an 
implication of the events to come. In early May 1933 a delegation of the SOC–Bishop Nikolai, 
Irinei Ćirić, Voja Janjić and priest Milovoi M. Petrović – finally visited Bulgaria, with the aim of 
negotiating on issues of peace and friendship between the two churches. In view of earlier events 
the visit was most certainly approved by the Yugoslav state authorities. During the talks in Rila 
monastery, presided over by Metropolitan Stefan, it was confirmed that a WA regional 
conference should be organized in Belgrade. A resolution of mutual interests was passed to 
foster the friendly relations between the two churches and countries.
111
 The council of the SOC 
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 acknowledged the initiative officially, but at this state it was advised to proceed with private 
consultations.
112
 The same month in cooperation with the Life and Work movement, the Balkan 
regional conference finally took place in Bucharest.
113
 The correspondence continued between 
church representatives with the aim of signing a resolution of mutual interests, but unfortunately 
a meeting, which was planned for that purpose in Rila, was postponed. In the fall of 1933, the 
rapprochement of the two states began, when in September the visits of the Bulgarian and 
Yugoslav royal couples took place.
114
 On the arrival of the Bulgarian royal couple to Belgrade 
the Yugoslav media emphasized the contribution of the Orthodox churches in the rapprochement 
between the two states.
115
 In September the representatives of the Yugoslav delegation attended 
an international meeting of the WA in Sofia.  
After the first steps of reconciliation the SOC was still cautious in its actions. The SOC 
General Assembly recommended in the spring of 1934 to continue monitoring the work of the 
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 BOC, especially in the light of discussions on its new constitution. If needed, the Assembly 
suggested protecting the rights of the SOC with the help of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
decision was repeated in 1935.116  
Interestingly enough, at the same time the SOC tried to ease the schismatic position of 
BOC among the Orthodox Churches. In November 1933, Metropolitan Gabriel Dožić visited the 
Patriarch of Constantinople and among other things discussed the issue of the Bulgarian schism. 
He was instructed in Belgrade to emphasize its administrative character. The Patriarch assured 
him that through negotiations and with good will all questions would be taken under 
consideration.117 
 In February 1934, the Balkan Pact was signed, but Bulgaria did not join. In May, after the 
coup in Bulgaria the rapprochement between the two churches and states continued. What needs 
to be emphasized is the fact that, even at this stage, the churches still used the WA NCs for 
further negotiations. It proves that there was a certain amount of uncertainty about its success 
and the WA was used as a third and experienced party. On the other hand, taking into account 
the fact that the persons who negotiated were either church leaders or senior clergy, it proves that 
the negotiations had to be approved at the highest possible level by the SOC as well as the 
Yugoslav state, as it was the state that directed the policy of the church in foreign relations. It 
also shows the importance the WA had gained in the region. 
The conference, which was attended by the representatives of the Bulgarian and 
Yugoslav NCs, had been initially planned to take place in Rila monastery in 1933, was held in 
September 1936 in the Yugoslav city of Ohrid, in the Monastery of St. Naum. Although it was 
                                                             
116
 ASSOC, Council's register of 1920–1934, AS, No. 55/85, June 4/May 22, 1934 and No. 63/1935. 
117
 AY, Embassy of the KY in Turkey–Ankara, 370–20–498; Consulate General of the KY in Istanbul, 
November 7, 1933, 411–8–19–21 and 8–174 (21341). After the visit Dožić went to Sofia, but 
unfortunately there is no information on the results of the visit. 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2016) XXXVI, 1 83
 the BNC who came, it was organized as if it was an official visit of the BOC. Before the 
negotiations the prominent Bulgarian delegation–Metropolitan Stefan,118 Bishop Paisie of 
Vratsa, Dr. Stefan Zankov, Archpriest Dimitar Andreev (протоиерей Димитър Андреев), 
secretary of the Clergy Union and George Tsvetinov (Георги Цветинов, Head of the 
Department of Religion at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria) and Deacon Nikitin – met 
with Patriarch Varnava, Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović, Prince Regent Paul, and other 
Yugoslav officials. They attended the celebration of King's birthday, participated in the parade of 
troops at Banjica, and during their tour in Yugoslavia gave speeches on the cooperation between 
the two nations. It was hoped that the contacts between the intellectuals would help to achieve 
the desired peace and overcome the prevalent suspicions towards the Balkans among West-
European countries.
119
  
 Before the meetings in the Monastery of St. Naum, Stefan and Irinei celebrated the Holy 
Eucharist together. The meetings concluded with an eight-point resolution, where both sides 
stressed the need to continue work on deepening the relationship between the two churches and 
nations. It was stated that the Rila resolution from 1933 had been acknowledged by bishops and 
clergy in both countries and it had become the cornerstone for the process of strengthening the 
mutual understanding between government leaders, as well as church leaders and social 
organizations in both countries. The NCs praised the late King Alexander I and Tsar Boris III for 
their contribution in re-establishing a friendly relationship between the two countries and prayed 
that the same kind of enthusiasm would continue to characterize their relations in future. The 
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 resolution ended with an emotional statement of the two nations of same blood and same faith 
standing together in unity. Dr. Vojislav Janjić presented an official statement, emphasizing the 
importance of the visit in achieving “our common objective,” meaning an agreement of mutual 
trust. The media coverage was, in general, positive. Only Glasnik SPP still emphasized the 
informal character of the visit.
120
 
 Rila and the Ohrid meetings were one of the most important prerequisites for the 
ecclesiastical, as well as political rapprochement of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.
121
 Bulgarian Prime 
Minister, Georgi Kjoseivanov, wrote in an article published in 1936 which argued that 
rapprochement had begun three years ago and that there were still some unresolved issues 
between the two countries. At the same time the two countries started negotiations to finalize a 
non-aggression pact.
122
 
 From 1936 onward, the Orthodox churches in the Balkan countries united their forces 
against Western spiritual influence in all of its positive and negative aspects such as secularism, 
materialism, and capitalism, and against the Western concept of the separation of church and 
state. The ecumenical movement, which significantly expanded after World War I, was also 
discussed. They initiated a new form for the meetings–an Orthodox Theological Congress. The 
first such meeting was organized in 1937 in Athens and the next gathering was planned for 1939 
in Bucharest.
123
 At the same time, the WA, representing the Western liberal spirit, objected to 
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 signals of violation of religious freedom regarding the activity of minority religious associations 
in Yugoslavia.
124
 
 Bilateral relations of the BOC and the SOC were normalized in next few years. In 1937 
discussions were held on the recognition of the ordination of the Anglican Church. In April 
1939, students from the Faculty of Theology in Sofia visited Belgrade.
125
 In a speech held in 
Novi Sad in 1939 Professor Zankov described the Serbs and Bulgarians as fellows sharing a 
spiritual kinship and blood.
126
 Yugoslav media advocated for the lifting of the schism.
127
 The 
cooperation continued in the first year of the Second World War, when in March 1940 a 
Committee for printing common liturgical books held a meeting in Sofia. Tsar Boris III met the 
SOC delegation.
128
 When Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Pact in March 1941, it changed the 
position of Bulgaria in the region considerably and nulled the 1937 Bulgarian-Yugoslav Pact.
129
 
Bishop Irinei and Metropolitan Stefan, now Exarch Stefan I, after the BOC autocephaly was 
recognized by the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 1945, met for the last time in Bulgaria in May 
1946, where the delegation of the SOC attended the celebration of Holy John of Rila.
130
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Conclusion 
 During the interwar period, the relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were 
characterized by conflicts and mutual distrust. The dissensions were the consequences of the 
Balkan wars and the First World War. Bulgaria was among the countries that had lost the First 
World War, which meant reparations, an obligation to reduce its army, and the loss of territories. 
The latter was the reason for future conflicts, because Bulgarians had to give up a large part of 
Macedonia, where according to their estimates over ninety percent of the population were 
Bulgarians. The Kingdom of SHS carried out a policy of assimilation, claiming that in terms of 
the ethnic origin the population of Macedonia was mostly Serbian. They were strongly opposed 
to the activity of IMRO, whose representatives resided in Bulgaria and often violently fought for 
an autonomous or independent Macedonia.  IMRO was a threat to Bulgarian stability as well, but 
at the same time it enabled Bulgaria to re-establish their influence and regain their lost territories 
in the region. 
The Macedonian question made it difficult for the two countries to normalize bilateral 
relations. There were several stages in the rapprochement process that were mostly influenced by 
the internal politics of the two countries. However, there was a religious dimension as well, 
which has not yet been analyzed. Most importantly it involved the activity of an ecumenical 
peace organization the World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the 
Churches.  
The WA was the most influential ecumenical organization in the region. It did not 
officially represent the churches, but at the same time the leading and senior clergy of the two 
churches represented the organization. The key roles in the activity of the national committees 
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 and in the entire WA were played by bishops Irenei Ćirić and Nikolaj Velimirović from the 
SOC, and by Metropolitan Stefan and Professor Stefan Zankov of the BOC. 
As the Ecumenical Patriarchate did not canonically recognize the BOC, the ecumenical 
movement was seen as a possibility to end its isolation. In addition to regaining its position in the 
Orthodox community, the BOC in its foreign relations activity represented the Tsardom of 
Bulgaria. For this reason it raised the question of the violation of the rights of Bulgarian 
minorities in neighboring countries.  
The WA became a diplomatic channel for negotiations between the SOC and the BOC 
representatives. In 1928 the BNC raised the question of minorities at a WA meeting in Avignon. 
The NCSCS managed to avoid public discussions in the WA through private negotiations for 
several years. At the same time the SOC expressed its willingness to support the BOC by calling 
the BOC to drop the issue of minorities and start negotiations to achieve the canonical 
recognition from the Ecumenical Patriarchate. 
Despite the fact that the BNC refused to remove the question from the agenda and 
refused to participate in the WA regional conference in Belgrade until the Yugoslav delegation 
privately visited Bulgaria to negotiate on the minorities’ issue, Yugoslav state officials refused to 
grant permission for the NCSCS to go to Bulgaria, which was the reason for the continuance of 
the conflict in the following years. No regional conference took place until 1933. During that 
time the members of BNC and NCSCS met regularly at WA meetings. 
In 1932 the BNC finally managed to discuss the matter at a WA meeting in Geneva. 
Although the representatives of the Yugoslav NC opposed any kind of interference concerning 
Macedonia, the WA, with its lack of knowledge about the issue, decided to establish a Minorities 
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 Committee. Although the Yugoslav delegation was not in favor of such a decision, it 
nevertheless managed to ease the situation in the long run. 
In 1933 the Yugoslav delegation finally visited Bulgaria. During the talks in Rila 
monastery a resolution of mutual interests was passed to foster friendly relations between the two 
churches and countries. Both heads of states exchanged short official visits the same year. The 
visit of 1933 and the negotiations conducted through the WA have to be considered as vital 
diplomatic channel in the rapprochement process. The WA offered a suitable alternative to 
church and state officials for negotiations. Even more important is the fact that the talks among 
WA representatives were carried on even when state support was not granted. 
The rapprochement process between state and church representatives continued in the 
next years. In 1936 the WA members met in the Monastery of St. Naum of Ohrid in Yugoslavia. 
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia signed a pact of eternal friendship in 1937. The SOC supported the 
removal of the schism from the BOC and the two churches were engaged in several cooperation 
projects. 
In general, the WA paved the way for the SOC and BOC for a deeper commitment to 
foster friendly relations between the Balkan churches and societies to overcome the historical 
and political differences between the two states. Although there were obstacles to achieve that 
goal, the aim of the WA, and especially the idealistic stance of the WA representatives in 
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, has to be highly valued. Although their work in the rapprochement 
process between the two countries was curtailed, their contribution in reaching a mutually 
satisfactory resolution and friendly coexistence between the two states has to be acknowledged. 
 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (JANUARY 2016) XXXVI, 1 89
